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Abstract 
The electoral competitiveness among candidates vying for single elected positions (e.g. president, 
members of parliament single member districts, or candidates for the party leadership) lacks an 
appropriate measurement. This paper reevaluates previous measurements and proposes a new indicator 
that accounts for the interaction between the number of candidates and the distribution of votes. The 
resulting indicator overcomes the oversensitivity problem associated with earlier specification and provides 
better competitiveness estimate for various electoral settings. Its applicability is universal and allows for 
cross-cases and longitudinal comparisons in single-winner elections. 
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1. Introduction 
Political competition lies at the heart of contemporary representative democracies. Its effects on a large 
number of electoral and political processes lead to a series of attempts to develop valid and reliable 
measures. Whereas the electoral competitiveness between political parties has been approached 
differently in various studies (Key 1949; Mayhew 1974; Ranney 1976; Bibby 1990; Przeworski 1991; 
Holbrook and van Dunk 1993; Vanhanen 1997; Hall 2001; Besley and Preston 2002; Bibby and Holbrook 
2001), considerable less attention has been devoted to the competition between individual candidates for 
a single post. A few examples of competitions falling in this category are the presidential and local 
elections (i.e. the mayor), elections in single member districts, or intra-party leadership selection.  
Although not focusing on individual competition, two approaches are useful. When referring to 
competitiveness, Mayhew (1974) employed the margin between the two largest parties. Adapted to 
individual contexts, the competitiveness is reflected by the margin between the two main candidates. 
Similarly, the measurement proposed by Vanhanen (1997) for the electoral competition between political 
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parties can be transposed in the setting of elections among individuals: the competitiveness is given by the 
share of the vote won by the most popular candidate. The major shortcoming of both indicators is that they 
ignore the number of candidates and the distribution of votes among candidates other than the first two in 
the case of Mayhew and the most popular candidate for Vanhanen.  
Two supplementary indicators are reviewed by Kenig (2009): the incumbents’ success rate and the 
likelihood of contests (direct coronations). Their weaknesses have been carefully revealed by the author: the 
incumbents’ success rate refers only to contests in which incumbents participate and where challengers are 
formally organized, whereas the coronations differentiates between single-candidate and multi-candidate 
instances (Kenig 2009, 244-245). To overcome these shortcomings, Kenig constructs an index – effective 
number of candidates (ENC) – based on the commonly used effective number of parties (ENP) index 
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979). And he incorporates “the absolute number of candidates" (denoted by N) 
into the ENC formula as the denominator to reflect “the extent to which the number of candidates had 
shrunk” (electoral competitiveness) (Kenig 2009, 246).  
Although this is the most sophisticated solution to account for competition for a single post 
developed so far, as we will demonstrate shortly, Kenig’s ENC/N index tends to underestimate the 
competitiveness of elections with larger number of candidates because the index is very sensitive to the 
marginal effect of N. This article proposes a new competitiveness index that alleviates these problems and 
improves the estimation precision through more efficient use of vote distribution in formation.  Our new 
competitiveness indicator is thus robust to and facilitates comparison of various kinds of electoral setting 
that involve different number of candidates and diverse vote distribution patterns. 
 
2. Problems with the ENC/N Index 
ENC/N is a decreasing function of the interaction term N*	∑ ௜ܸଶ. Kenig added an N term to normalize his 
ENC index on a 0-1 scale with an aim to “reflect the distribution of votes and [will] neutralize the effect of 
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the absolute number of candidates”; however, only scant attention is paid to the behavior of the marginal 
effects of this interaction term when its two components, N and ∑ ௜ܸଶ, are evaluated at the opposite 
extremes.  
Figure 1 shows how the curvature of the ENC/N index surface changes when	∑ ௜ܸଶ and N are 
evaluated across their full range of values.1 At higher levels of 	∑ ௜ܸଶ (higher concentration of votes in a few 
candidates), smaller N makes the ENC/N index more competitive, as exhibited in the quick “jump” in 
curvature in the direction of N when the absolute value of N falls under 2-a phenomenon which is 
empirically unsound. In addition, note that as ∑ ௜ܸଶ  approaches 0, the ENC/N index shoots up to its 
maximum value (1) regardless of the parameter value on the N-axis, as shown in the light-colored 
trapezoid-shape area in the upper right corner of this plot, causing identification problem in this area when 
one tries to compare the relative competitiveness among contests with different size of N. Apparently, 
Kenig's specification fails to achieve its intended purposes. 
 
Figure 1: ENC/N as a Function of 	∑ࢂ࢏૛ and N 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 We set N ∈ (1, 4) for illustration purpose. 
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We argue that these biases are rooted in the multiplicative nature of the ENC/N index's denominator term. 
First, recall that Kenig's ENC/N index is just the inverse of the multiplicative term ܰ ∗ ∑ ௜ܸଶ ∀ i = 1,…, N. 
Theoretically speaking, as N increases, at the margin, it tends to pull votes away from major contenders 
because more candidates always present more alternatives for selectorates, which makes the distribution 
of votes less concentrated. According to Kenig (2009, 236), a more equal distribution of votes would make 
the contests more competitive.  
However, ENC/N is decreasing in both N and ∑ ௜ܸଶ  through the composite denominator term 
ܰ ∗ ∑ ௜ܸଶ, and in Kenig's specification N is any integers ൒ 2 while ∑ ௜ܸଶ is bounded between 0 and 1,2 it is 
easy to see that the marginal effect of N drives down the ENC/N  score faster than	∑ ௜ܸଶ. When we compare 
two elections with similar vote distribution patterns, the election with more fringe candidates will receive 
much lower ENC/N estimate owing to N’s much larger diminishing marginal effect than that of ∑ ௜ܸଶ. 
Even in instances with the same number of candidates the ENC/N index is slightly problematic as it 
is influenced by the share of votes received by the winner. If this is small, then the index is large (see H1 and 
H4). Apart from this, his index is quite sensitive to the vote share received by small competitors and to the 
number of competitors (at the expense of difference between the first two candidates). A practical 
illustration of these shortcomings is reflected in the four hypothetical situations listed in Table 1. Elections 
ܪଵ and ܪଶ illustrate this issue: the vote share difference between the first three candidates is similar, the 
share of the winner is smaller in ܪଵ; At the same time, the share of the least popular candidate is higher. 
Consequently, ܪଵ’s competitiveness index goes up. Elections ܪଷ and ܪସ show how the index overestimates 
the diminishing marginal effect exerted by small competitors. The presence of fringe candidates 
significantly alters the competitiveness index.  
 
                                                            
2 The fact that ∑ ௜ܸଶ is a squared term means that the effect of vote share on electoral competitiveness has been scaled down. 
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Table 1: Share of Votes, Number of Candidates, and Competitiveness Index 
Vote Share ࡴ૚ ࡴ૛ ࡴ૜ ࡴ૝ 
V1 32 33 32 30 
V2 28 29 28 28 
V3 21 22 21 21 
V4 19 16 18 19 
V5   1 1 
V6    1 
ENC/N 0.957 0.936 0.777 0.670 
 
It is worth elaborating the identification problem outlined previously. This issue is related to Kenig’s 
attempt to transform the unbounded ENC indicator into a bounded index. This is commendable because 
such treatment allows the ENC/N index of the same N-class to be well-behaved within the 0-1 scale, but it 
also constrains our ability to extend our competitiveness analysis of elections whose N(s) range across the 
full range of possible values. Some simple algebraic expressions might help clarify this issue. Suppose for a 
given election, votes are equally distributed among all N candidates, this election’s ENC/N score is 
calculated as 
ଵ
ே∗∑௏೔మ
 = ଵ
ே∗൬ே∗ቀభಿቁ
మ൰
 = 1 
implying the maximum level of competitiveness. Note the maximum value is invariant to the size of N. 
Although Kenig acknowledged his ENC/N index “works to its best when the (absolute) number of 
candidates is equal” (Ibid, 245), one is hard-pressed to accept the notion that, when votes are equally 
distributed, candidates in a three-way election face the same level of competitiveness as their counterparts 
in a canonical two-way contest as suggested by their identical maximum value (1). 3  This built-in 
identification problem presents an estimation bias that needed to be reckoned with. 
In sum, when vote distribution statistics are similar across elections, the ENC/N index tends to 
underestimate the competitiveness of elections having higher number of candidates due to N’s larger 
                                                            
3 We should also point out that when votes are distributed perfectly equal, as the number of candidates increases, the sum of 
squared per candidate vote share (∑ ௜ܸଶ) will decrease, so the ENC index will go up. Unfortunately, this increasing 
competitiveness effect of N  is entirely offset by the N term that Kenig used to normalize the ENC index.   
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diminishing marginal effect and when vote shares are perfectly equal among candidates, the index cannot 
distinguish the relative competitiveness among elections with different number of candidates. In the next 
section, we propose a remedy that alleviates these biases but retains N's desirable property. 
 
3. A Variance Component Approach 
Our task is to find a feasible approach to scale down N's marginal effect without altering the diminishing 
effect it exerts on the ENC/N index through its interaction with ∑ ௜ܸଶ. We want to achieve this without doing 
too much violence to Kenig's original ENC/N functional form since it attends appropriately to the 
interaction between N and ∑ ௜ܸଶ. A simple solution is simply to take the square root of N and then plug it 
into the original formula: 
ܣ݆݀ ாே஼ே 	≡ 	
ଵ
√ே∗∑௏೔మ
 , ∀ i = 1,…, N                                                        (1) 
Because √ܰ	shrinks	the	absolute	value	of	N, our adjusted ENC/N index is thus less sensitive to the 
marginal change in N.  Also note that our Adj-ENC/N  index will give a maximum value of √ܰ when votes 
are equally distributed and this value is monotonically increasing in N. We regard our unbounded Adjாே஼ே  
to more faithfully capture the increasing level of competitiveness as a result of more equally-competitive 
candidates entering the race, as compared to the maximum value estimated by the ENC/N index which is 
unconditional on N. 
Our attempt to propose electoral competitiveness indicator (ECI) does not stop here. Although the 
Adjாே஼ே  marks an improvement over the original ENC/N index in terms of underestimation bias (for 
elections with large N) and identification problem, a competitiveness indicator is only useful when it can 
be used to evaluate the relative competitiveness of elections that have diverse vote distribution and 
number of candidates {∑ ௜ܸଶ , N} profiles. If the original ENC/N index works (partially) fine only when the 
number of candidates is equal, we would like to extrapolate our analysis to instances that beyond this 
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constraint. To this aim, an adjustment factor would be needed to offset the inherent downward bias 
imposed by the N term in our  Adjாே஼ே  indicator. 
Empirically, as N increases, it makes the distribution of votes less concentrated in major 
candidates which then causes the election to become more competitive; on the contrary, holding N 
constant, higher ∑ ௜ܸଶ indicates that the distribution of votes is concentrated in a handful of candidates 
(i.e., large ∑ ௜ܸଶ), which makes the election less competitive. Clearly, two competing effects are at work in 
influencing electoral competitiveness and their effects are translated through the vote distribution 
mechanism; however, this mechanism is poorly modeled by the specification of equation (1) because 
ENC/N is strictly decreasing in both ∑ ௜ܸଶ and N. The question now comes down to how can we make more 
efficient use of the information supplied by {∑ ௜ܸଶ , N} to improve our competitiveness estimates across 
cases having diverse N. 
Ideally, we need an adjustment factor that can adjudicate the competing effects of ∑ ௜ܸଶ and N on 
vote distribution and allow us to use this information to determine the proportion of the variance in 
electoral competitiveness that should be estimated by the estimator derived in (1). A useful first step 
toward the construction of such factor is to conceptualize the relationship between ∑ ௜ܸଶ and N as that 
between variance ߪଶand sample size n in a random effects model. Unlike classical regression analysis 
where the group-level predictors (ߙ௝) and regression mean (ߤ) are collinear,4 in a random effects model 
group-level predictors are shrunk toward their own estimated value (ߙො௝) for groups with more observation 
(n) and when within-group standard deviation (ߪ௝) is small, but there is more pooling toward regression 
mean (ߤ) when the between-group standard deviation (ߪఈ) is small: 
 
                                                            
4 The between-group variances (ߪఈଶ) are assumed to be zero and distributed I.I.D. 
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ߙ௝ 	ൎ 	ቌ
೙ೕ
഑ೕమ
೙ೕ
഑ೕమ
ା	 భ഑ഀమ
ቍ ߙො௝  + ቎1 െ	ቌ
೙ೕ
഑ೕమ
೙ೕ
഑ೕమ
ା	 భ഑ഀమ
ቍ቏ 	ߤ                               (2) 
This same logic also applies electoral competitiveness analysis. An increase in ௝ܰ  smoothes out 
marginally the within-election (or between-candidate) vote share variance and shrinks the estimate toward 
this particular election’s Adjாே஼ே  value given by equation (1) ; on the contrary, higher ∑ ௜ܸଶ implies greater 
within-election vote share variance, which pools the estimate toward the mean estimate ൫√ܰ൯. By 
expression (2), we can similarly define a pooling factor for election j with N candidates: 
߮	 ≡ 	
ೀ
∑ೇ೔ೕమ
ೀ
∑ೇ೔ೕమ
ା	 ೀ
ೀ∗ቆ భೀቇ
మ
  .                                                         (3) 
We then multiply expression (3) by equation (1) to denote the proportion of electoral competitiveness to 
be estimated by election j’s unique Adjாே஼ே  value, and let ሺ1 െ 	߮ሻ proportion of this competitiveness 
estimate to be pooled toward the mean estimate ൫√ܰ൯. Adding these two parts together, we get a 
weighted competitiveness estimator, Electoral Competitiveness Indicator (ECI): 
ECI ≡ 	߮ ൬ ଵඥேೕ∗∑௏೔ೕమ	൰  ൅  ሺ1 െ 	φሻඥ ௝ܰ                                        (4) 
 
Clearly, this weighted estimator tends to attribute the original estimator (equation (1)) greater weight 
whenever ௝ܰ  is large but pools toward the election mean when ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ increases and these partial pooling 
effects are translated through the adjustment factor ߮ because  డఝడே > 0 and 
డఝ
డሺ∑௏೔మሻ
 < 0. 
How does the ECI work? Table 2 replicates the same four hypothetical examples (ܪଵ to ܪସ) from 
Table 1 to illustrate the operation of our competitiveness indicator, ECI. We complements our analysis 
with two other hypothetical cases (ܪହ to ܪ଺) to examine if the weighted ECI estimate is robust in instances 
when votes are distributed perfectly equal among candidates. The comparison of election ܪଵ  to ܪଶ 
 
9 
provides a modal case to elucidate the mechanism of our adjustment factor, ߮. The effect of smaller vote 
share difference between the pair of two weaker candidates, ଷܸ and ସܸ, in ܪଵ (0.2 versus ܪଶ’s 0.6) is 
picked up by ܪଵ ’s smaller ∑ ௜ܸଶ  and translated to its higher ߮  value, thereby shrinking the estimate 
toward ܪଵ’s unique Adjாே஼ே . Because ܪଵ has higher Adj
ாே஼
ே  estimate (1.915709), it therefore receives a 
higher ECI score than ܪଶ. This exercise shows how the ECI uses the information supplied by ∑ ௜ܸଶ to 
adjudicate the relative competitiveness between cases. 
We now turn to instances when the elections being compared have different number of 
candidates. The comparison of  ܪଵ to ܪଷ highlights the ability of the ECI to detect the marginal increase in 
competitiveness made by the presence of one fringe candidate ( ହܸ ) in ܪଷ  , the ECI gives a higher 
competitiveness estimate for ܪଷ through more pooling toward its election mean (√5, which is higher than 
ܪଵ’s ൫√4൯) despite its having lower Adjாே஼ே  score than that of ܪଵ. Also, when two more fringe candidates 
were present and absorb a small share of the vote away from the strongest candidate ( ଵܸ), thus narrowing 
the vote margin between the two leading candidates ( ଵܸ and ଶܸ), a situation typified by scenario ܪସ, our 
ECI correctly delivers a higher competitiveness score for ܪସ  against the baseline scenario ܪଵ  as 
compared to the estimates obtained by using the ENC/N index in Table 1 which incorrectly gives election 
ܪଵ higher competitiveness estimate (0.957854) than ܪସ (0.669882). Finally, we look at election ܪହ to 
ܪ଺, our analysis shows that even under perfectly equal vote share scenario, our ECI still outperforms 
Kenig’s ENC/N. ECI assigns higher score to elections with larger number of candidates (N) as opposed to 
the ENC/N index which is invariant to the marginal change in N when the index is evaluated at its 
maximum value. This brief analysis persuasively demonstrates the flexibility and improved precision of our 
proposed variance component-based estimator in comparing competitiveness of electoral contests with 
unequal N. 
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Table 2: Share of Votes and Competitiveness of Elections in Six Hypothetical Contexts 
Vote Share ܪଵ ܪଶ ܪଷ ܪସ ܪହ ܪ଺ 
ଵܸ 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.2 0.166 
ଶܸ 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.2 0.166 
ଷܸ 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.166 
ସܸ 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.166 
ହܸ   0.01 0.01 0.2 0.166 
଺ܸ    0.01  0.166 
෍ ௜ܸଶ 0.261 0.267 0.2574 0.2488 0.2 0.1653 
N 4 4 5 6 5 6 
Adjாே஼ே  1.915709 1.872659 1.737427 1.640869 2.236068 2.469742 
߮ 0.489237 0.483559 0.437254 0.401156 0.500000 0.520400 
ECI 1.958762 1.938423 2.018035 2.125107 2.236068 2.557929 
 
4. Discussion 
This paper proposes a new measurement of electoral competitiveness between candidates running for 
single positions. Our indicator improves the estimation precision of previously developed measures (Kenig 
2009) through more efficient use of vote distribution information. In that respect, ECI provides good 
estimates across competitions with varying number and strength of candidates. In a nutshell, it is better 
than any previous measure and easy to use. Whereas the methodological implications of the ECI have been 
clearly outlined in the body of the paper, there are at least three major empirical benefits. First, the ECI is a 
universal measure for competitiveness in various electoral competitions for a single elected position. It is 
not sensitive to time or place. It allows comparability of a broad range of electoral contests. On these 
grounds, the second empirical implication is that ECI can be used in a variety of studies ranging from the 
electoral competitions (e.g. of candidates in single-member districts to leadership positions in 
organizations (i.e. political parties, administration, civil society etc.). Third, it enhances the processes of 
replication and reliability control. Researchers can use the ECI to take a retrospective look at various 
elections and evaluating their level of competitiveness.  
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APPENDIX: How to calculate the ECI 
 
1. Operationalization 
To impute the ECI, we need the results of the electoral contests, the number of effective candidates (N), and 
we have to normalize each candidate’s vote share ( ௜ܸ) between 0 and 1. To express this concept formally, 
assuming there are N candidates 
i = 1, 2, 3,…, n, and N > 0, 
 
and each candidate receives ௜ܸ’s of total vote in a particular election where: 
 
௜ܸ  ∈ [0, 1)5 and ∑ ௜ܸ௡ଵ  = 1. 
 
2. Computing the ECI 
2.1 The adjusted ENC/N index 
This “adjusted” index measures the competitiveness of an election. As noted in the paper, we want this 
measure to be able to capture the increasing competitiveness resulting from more candidates entering the 
race without this positive effect being overtly diluted by the N term in the denominator. To alleviate N’s 
larger marginal effect (relative to ∑ ௜ܸଶ௡ଵ ), we use the square root of N in the specification and 
operationalize our adjusted ENC/N index as 
 
ܣ݆݀ ாே஼ே 	≡ 	
ଵ
√ே∗∑௏೔మ
 , ∀ i = 1,…, N.                                      (1) 
 
Note that the adjusted ENC/N index is less sensitive to the marginal change in N because the square root 
scales down the marginal effect of N. This operationalization procedure has desirable property in the sense 
that when votes are equally distributed among candidates, as we illustrated in the comparison of scenario 
ܪହ and ܪ଺ in the paper, √ܰ specification allows the interactive denominator term, √ܰ*∑ ௜ܸଶ௡ଵ , to vary 
according to changes in N and vote shares distribution among candidates. This overcomes the 
identification problem that plagued Kenig’s ENC/N index. 
 
                                                            
5 This condition is necessary because candidates who are effective candidates that enter into our computation 
cannot receive a vote share smaller than or equal to zero. 
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2.2 The pooling factor 
Another methodological contribution of this study is that we extend the assessment of electoral 
competitiveness beyond cases with the same number of candidates. We want to re-emphasize here that 
there are two competing effects at work in influencing electoral competitiveness. An increase in N flattens 
vote distribution, causing elections to be more competitive while higher ∑ ௜ܸଶ makes vote distribution 
more concentrated, indicating less electoral competitiveness. As we argued in the paper, this mechanism 
is poorly modeled by the original ENC/N index and the specification of expression (1) since ܣ݆݀ ாே஼ே  is 
decreasing in both ∑ ௜ܸଶ and √ܰ. To extrapolate our analysis beyond this constraint would require an 
adjustment factor to offset the downward bias imposed by the N term without discarding useful 
``competitiveness” information (i.e., relative vote share among candidates) contained in the interaction 
term, √ܰ*∑ ௜ܸଶ௡ଵ . 
We first need to construct a pooling factor to partial out the vote share variances associated with 
an election’s (say, election j) unique vote share pattern  ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ from the expected vote share variance of an 
election with N effective candidates which is simply this the mean value, ଵேೕ (i.e., when each candidate 
receives equal vote share, ଵܸ ൌ 	 ଶܸ ൌ ⋯ ൌ ௡ܸ ൌ 	 ଵேೕ , and 
ଵ
ேೕ  is unconditional on the value and the 
distribution of ௜ܸ). As we have elucidated in our paper, we use ௝ܰ  and ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ to approximate the effective 
number of candidates and within-election vote share variance in election j, respectively. We then 
operationalize the pooling factor ߮ as: 
߮	 ≡ 	
ೀ
∑ೇ೔ೕమ
ೀ
∑ೇ೔ೕమ
ା	 ೀ
ೀ∗ቆ భೀቇ
మ
  .                                                        (3) 
 
Where ߮  determines the amount of vote share variance that are deviated from the expected mean 
estimate and which should be estimated by election-specific competitiveness estimate, ܣ݆݀ ாே஼ே . By (1) 
and (3), we now specify our ECI as a weighted estimator: 
 
ECI ≡ 	߮ ൬ ଵඥேೕ∗∑௏೔ೕమ	൰  ൅  ሺ1 െ 	φሻඥ ௝ܰ                                     (4) 
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where √ܰ is the expected vote share variance which is calculated from ଵ√ே∗∑௏೔మ ൌ 	
ଵ
√ே∗൬ே∗ቀభಿቁ
మ൰
ൌ √ܰ, 
by (1) and given condition that ଵܸ ൌ 	 ଶܸ ൌ ⋯ ൌ ௡ܸ ൌ 	 ଵே. Note that because 
డఝ
డே = 
ଵ
∑௏మ > 0 and 
డఝ
డሺ∑௏మሻ = 
െ ଵሺ∑௏మሻమ ቀ
ଶ
∑௏మ 	൅ 	ܰቁ < 0, ߮ is increasing in ௝ܰ  but decreasing in ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ௡ଵ , a larger effective candidate 
size, N, pools the ECI estimate toward the adjusted ENC/N index, while a larger within-election vote share 
variance,  ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ	, makes  ଵඥேೕ∗∑௏೔ೕమ	 a less precise competitive estimator and therefore pools the ECI 
toward the √ܰ since the computation of the latter does not depend on the information of ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ	. 
 
3. Application 
Now consider the six hypothetical election scenarios from Table 2:  
 
Vote 
share ܪଵ ܪଶ ܪଷ ܪସ ܪହ ܪ଺ 
ଵܸ 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.3 0.2 0.16 
ଶܸ 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.2 0.16 
ଷܸ 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.16 
ସܸ 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.16 
ହܸ     0.01 0.01 0.2 0.16 
଺ܸ       0.01   0.16 
 
We first square the  ௜ܸ  value in each column and sum them together to obtain the vote share variance for 
each hypothetical election scenario, ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ	for j = 1 to 6.	We get : 
 
  ܪଵ ܪଶ ܪଷ ܪସ ܪହ ܪ଺ 
෍ ௜ܸ௝ଶ	 0.261 0.267 0.2574 0.2488 0.2 0.1536 
 
 
We then substitute each election’s ௝ܰ  and ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ	into expression (1) to calculate the ܣ݆݀ ாே஼ே  for each 
election scenario, which are given below:        
 
  ܪଵ ܪଶ ܪଷ ܪସ ܪହ ܪ଺ 
AdjENC/N 1.915709 1.872659 1.737427 1.640869 2.236068 2.657867 
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We now compute the relevant statistics required to estimate ߮.  First we use the information given in each 
election scenario’ ൛ ௝ܰ, ∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ	ൟ to obtain their ேೕ∑௏೔ೕమ and 
ேೕ
ேೕ∗ቆ భೀቇ
మ (which equals ܰଶ). We then use these 
statistics to calculate ߮, which is simply the ratio of ேೕ∑௏೔ೕమ to the sum of 
ேೕ
∑௏೔ೕమ
 and 
ேೕ
ேೕ∗ቆ భೀቇ
మ by expression (3). 
 
  ܪଵ ܪଶ ܪଷ ܪସ ܪହ ܪ଺ 
௝ܰ
∑ ௜ܸ௝ଶ 15.32567 14.98127 19.42502 24.11576 25 39.0625 
௝ܰ
௝ܰ ∗ ൬ 1௝ܰ൰
ଶ 
16 16 25 36 25 36 
߮ 0.489237 0.483559 0.437254 0.401155 0.5 0.5204 
 
Finally, we substitute the values of ܣ݆݀ ாே஼ே ,  ߮ and the expected (unconditional) vote share variance, √ܰ 
into expression (3) to get each election’s ECI score: 
 
  ܪଵ ܪଶ ܪଷ ܪସ ܪହ ܪ଺ 
ECI 1.958762 1.938423 2.018035 2.125107 2.236068 2.557929 
 
 
 
